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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
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\V. LYNN HERTIG,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN INSTRUCTING ON THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DEFINE
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE
HAZARD.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO KEEP A
LOOKOUT.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VERY PROPERLY REFUSED TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT; AND THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY DENIED DE'FENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
Respondents are not entirely in agreement with the
Rtatmnent of fa.cts set forth in appellant's brief.
The incident giving rise to thi~ legal action occurred
on ~larch 15, 1962 (R. 1-t7, at about 6 :30 o'clock p.m.
(R. 150, R. 126).
The incident occurred at a ti1ne when it was still
daylight, and visibility was good (R. 150). The weather
was clear (R. 150).
At the intersection of 13th East and the Cottonwood
Diagonal, the roads are both asphalt-based roads. For
all practical purposes, at the point of intersection, they
are level and straight (R. 129). lmn1edia.tel~~ to the south
of the intersection there is a stop sign on 13th East facing south, directing traffic proceeding north on 13th
E'ast to stop (R. 129). The speed lin1it on the Cottonwood Diagonal at the ti1ue of the incident wa~ fifty
miles per hour (R. 131).
At the point of intersection of the two streets 13th
East runs north and south (see Exhibits 1P .and 9B).' The
Cottonwood Diagonal runs southwest-northeast at its
intPr~eetion with 13th I1Jast (see Exhibits 1P and 9D).
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Jl r. Jlnhlbaeh was proceeding northwest on the
Cottonwood Diagonal (R. 147). As he approached the
intPrSP<'tion of the Cottonwood Diagonal and 13th East,
he saw thP light colon·d Olds1nobile being driven by the
dPfendant, ~lr. Ilertig (R. 148). :Jir. ~luhlbach first saw
~lr. Hertig's car when it was smne two to three hundr:ed
feet south of the s.top sign on 13th East (R. 166).
As ~[r. Th:fuhlbaeh "·as approaching the inters<>rtion,
he was proct>eding down the Cottonwood Diagonal at
about -tO 1nilPs per hour, hut as he neared the intersection,
he slowPd to about thirt~·-five to thjrty-six miles per hour
(R. 160 and R. 166).
:Jlr. Hertig appt>ared to either cmnpletely or nearly
stop for the stop sign (R. 162). Thir. ~Iuhlbach thought
Mr. Hertig wowd remain stopped at the stop sign until
:Jir. l\luhl'bach had passed (R. 149, 166). A.t any rah.. ,
~lr. :\Juhlbach blasted his large air horn to give additional warning to l\lr. Hertig (R. 149), but l\Ir. Hertig
suddenly g-avE' a hurst of speed and shot right in front of
~fr. ~[uhlbach (R.149).
~Ir. Jed K. l\lel\IiUan, a witness who was proceeding southeast on the Cottonwood Diagonal, noticed that
the auton1o1bile being driven by l\Ir. Hertig appeared to
be proceeding straight north on 13th East, brut following
the blast of the air horn, 1nade a hasty left turn down
the Diagonal, and that the Hertig car was under such
heavy acceleration that it appeared to "fishtail" down
the Diagonal (R. 270, 271).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
~lr. Thluhlbach carne so close to Mr. Hertig that he
thought he had hit him; in fact, he was so close that Mr.
1\Iulbach couldn't see the top of ~Ir. Hertig's automobile
because the top of Th:Ir. 1\Iuhlbach's fender obstructed
his view (R. 168). l\Ir. 1\Iuhlbach then veered his truck
to the right in order to avoid a collision with the Hertig
vehicle and then rolled over and slid down into the ditch,
darnaging his vehicle (R. 150).
Thlr. Hertig then proceded down the Diagonal at a
spP(~d of about fifty ruiles per hour (R. 1S7) until an
individual stopped 1\lr. Hertig and said that a truck had
just about run into the rear end of his car and that he had
better go back (R.185).
:Mr. Hertig admits that he never did see 1\Ir. 1\Iuhltruck until he had been rturned to the scene of the
incident and saw it in the ditch (R. 185).
bach'~

ARGP:JIENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN INSTRUCTING ON THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE.

The Court presented the doctrine of sudden enlergrney to the jur:· in instruction No. 16 (R. 94), a~ follows:
"One who, in a sudden emergency, acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of
lack of time .to form a judgment, omits to act in
the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with
contributory negligence, provided he exercise~
in the en1ergency the care of a reasonable prudent
individual under li!ke ci rcurnstances.
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"In ~urh a :-;ituation, hi:-; duty is to exerei:-;E>
only the degree of care which an ordinary pn1dent
person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. If, at that n1mnent, he exercises
such care, he does all the law requires of hiin, even
though, in the light of after-events, it might appear that a different choic-e and manner of action,
would have been better and safer."
This type of instruction was approved in a Utah
ease entitled, Redd v. Airu;ay il/otor Coach Lines (1943)
104 lT.9, 137 P.2d 37-t, 377.
The law is c.Iear that the plaintiff is not burdened'
with the duty of requesting the Court to give instructions
which set up defenses cla1ned by the defendant.
Plaintiff, in proposing an instruction on his theory
of the ease, is not required to also propose instructions
setting out all of the possible defenses thereto. If de·fendant desires instruction on defenses to any ground
which would allow plaintiff to recover, he should propose
them.
Defendant did not request any instructions whatsoever on the sudden mnergenc.y doctrine.
Defendant cites in his brief the California case of
Jones v. Henrick, 49 Cal. App. 2d 702, 122 P.2d 304; however, this case specifically points out that in that case,
the c01nplaining party requested the Court to place a
lin1itation on the instruction given by the Court.
Instruction N·o. 16 very succintly st~a.tes what degree of care is to be expected from an individual acting
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in ernergent:·. It left opt>n to the jury the question of
whether or not an einergency, in fact, existed.
vVhile the appellant contends that the giving of this
instruction took the question of contributory negligence
from the jury, it should be pointed out that the jury was
very carefully instructed that none of the instructions
given should he considered alone, and that they should all
he considered with reference to one another. The entire
eharge given to the jury very carefully and accurately
placed the question of contributory negligence before
the jury.
Instruction
states:

~ o.

2S as given by the Court (R. 106)

"These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be considered and construed by you
as one connected whole. Each instruction should
be read and understood with reference to and as
a part of the entire charge and not as though one
instruction separately was intended to present the
whole law of the eas·e on any paxtieular point.
For that reason, you are not to single out any
certain sentenee or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but ~~ou are to
eonsider all the instructions, as a "·hole, and to
regard each in the light of all the others."
Ins.truetions No. 13 (R. 91), 14 (R. 92) and 13 (R.
set forth contributory negligenee as a defense.

~)~)) clear]~·

jur~·

It is clPar the trial court correctly instructed the
a1-1 to the law applicable to the cas·e.
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rfhe insh11ction 011 ~udden Pmergeney left it Up to the
jur~· to detennine whether or not a sudden einerg·ency
in fact, Pxisted. The instruction deals only with the sequence of evenhi occurring after an einergency c01nes into
Pxistance.

If the jury wPre to have found that the plaintiff was
negligent prior to the existance of an einergency, h~· virtue of the other instructions contained in the charge,
they \\·ere instructed that if such negligence proximately
contributed to the plaintiff's injury, that they should
find the issue in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiflf and return a verdict, "No cause of action."

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DEFINE
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE
HAZARD.

It should be noted that since 1961, the laws with
respect to rights of way between vehicles while one is
n1aking a left turn, between vehicles entering open intersections, and vehicles entering through highways from
stop signs, have been mnended. Prior to recent amendInents, in the ease of vehicles entering open intersections at right angles to one another, our laws were such
that we actually created a rac-e between the two vehicles
in that the one first entering the intersection had the
right of way and was deen1ed the favored driver. 41-6-72
l' tah Code Annotated 1953 'vas amended to read that
when vehicles entered an intersection at right angles to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one another and at appro.rimately (italics ours) the
S'an1e time the vehicle to the left shall yield the right
'
of wa:v to the vehicle on theright.
\Ve had a situation prior to 1961, by virtue of 41-6-73
Utah Code Annotated in which if two vehicles were proceeding in opposite dir·ections and one intended to make
a left turn, the one so intending to make a left turn
should have yielded the right of way to any vehicle approaching frorn the opposite direction which \Vas within
the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard. Apparently this had been interpreted to mean
an immediate ha:zJard at the time the driver intending to
make a left turn co1n1nenced his left turn. In 1961, this
statute was amended by adding, "during the time when
such driver is Inoving within the intersection." The effect of this amend1nent is to prohibit the left turn if an
im1nediate hazard would be created at any ti1ne while
the driver 1naking a lelft turn was in the intersection.
Likewise, in 1961 the law concerning entering a
through highway from a stop sign was amended to 1nake
right-of-way Inore definite; in 1961 the legislature enacted +1-6-7-l-.10, sub-section (b) of which proYides:
"Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a
vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated
by a s'top sign shall stop as required by section
41-6-99 and after having stopped shall yield the
right-of-way to an~~ vehicle which has entered the
intersection fro1n another highwa~~ or which is
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approaching so dosely on another highway as to
constitute an i1n1nediate hazard during the t·i me
wheu s1tch driver is mov-i-nq across or within the
intersection." (it·alics ours),
rrlw experience of several decades of high-speed
nwtor travel has demanded laws he Inore definite in the
area of right of way. It is obvious tha1Inodern high speed
travel on freeway-type highways would be ilnpossible
if driver:-; approaching such highways could enter thereon and loiter aero:-;s the highway while approaching traffic wa:-; proceeding at high rates of speed and in possibly.
as n1a.n ~- as six l~anes of tra!ffic.

,.rhe 1961 Legislature wisely added the phrase to
our laws dealing with entering through-highways from
side roads controlled by stop signs to include the phrase,
"during the tin1e when such driver is 1noving across or
within the intersection."
Prior to the 1961 mnendment, the point of time used
to detennine whether or not other vehicles approaching
constituted an ilnmedi,ate hazard was apparent the instant the driver entering from the side road was entering
the intersect,ion. The .amend1nent changed the period of
ti1ne for detennination of what constituted an immediate
hazard to include all of the time during which the driver
entering the through-highway was moving across or within the intersection.
It should be noted that the cases cited by appellant
in his brief under Point II were decided prior to 1961,
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and in light of recent an1endn1ents, are no longer applicable.
It should also be notieed fron1 the defendant's requested instructions (R. 51-77) that defendant failed to
rP<luest an appropriate instruction dealing with the definition of ''im1nediate hazard."
The evidence showed that when :Mr. Hertig had
straightened out his autOinobile after ma:king his left turn
to proceed northwest on the Cottonwood Diagonal, the
truck belonging to the plaintiff was at his side. The
1estimon~· of ill r. Hertig, which appears in the record at
pages 2:25 and 226 clParly indicates this. The question
wa~ asked:
"So, it is quite probable, is it not, that, at the
ti1ne you looked in your rear view nlirror, when
you had straightened out, that the reason you
didn't see the truck was because it would be n1ore
or less to your side?"
Answer: ''Yes, I "~ould say so; at least, not
directly behind me."
It is evident that when ~lr. Hertig ·was commencing
his left turn, the plaintiff had taken evasive action and
swPrved to the right so that while ~Ir. Hertig \Yas still
in the intersection 1naking his left-hand turn, the plaintiff was to the right side of ~Ir. Hertig in the intersection.
It is obvious that ~Lr. 1\Iuhlbach's truck was so close
to the intersection at the time Mr. Hertig comn1enced
proceeding through the interse·ction that there was an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inunediate hazard. rrlw question of whether or not ~I r.
~I uhl bach':-; truck constituted an immediatP hazard i:-; a
quP:-;tion of fad, and not IH·ee:-::-;aril~· a question of law .
1

.A ppPllant HPPlll:-; to lay great ::-;treHH on the case of
f(iclwrd . . - 1' • .Audersou (1959) 9 U.2d 17, 337 P.2d :J9.
Fir:-;t, it i~ to be ren1e1nberPd that this l'ase was decidPd
prior to recent a1nend1nents above referred to and i~ no
longer applicable; and second, that in the Richards v .
. . !ud e rso n, <'asP, the vehicle entPring frmn the stopsign
was proceeding at what may be regarded a~ an unusually
slow ~peed.
Prior to the recent mnendment, the point of time
for detef1nining whether an inunediate hazard would exi~t wa:-; apparPntly the instant a driver entered a throughhighway fron1 a stopsign. In light of recent amend1nents,
a~ the ti1ne for determining whether an innnediate hazard
Pxi:-;t~ include~ all of the tirne the driver entering from
the ~top sign is \\·ithin the intersection, it is suggested that
the Richard,..,· 1·. A 11derson case i8 no longer controlling.
It is also important to note that in the Richards v.
Audersun case, the vehicle entering the through highway

frmn the stop sign was proceeding at an average speed
of about five miles per hour. In the case now pending
before the Supreme Court on appeal, the individual entering the through highway fron1 the stop sign did so at
extrmne acceleration (R.. 271).
\YherP one driver enters a through highway fron1 a
stop sign tmder heavy acceleration and forees another
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driver on the through highway off the roadway, it does
not seetn that ·a finely -detailed instruction on what con~titutes an inunediate hazard would serve any useful
purpose. The words, "im1nediate hazard" are not ·rubove
the comprehension of layman.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO KEEP A
LOOKOUT.

Appe1lant urges under Point III of his brief that the
lower court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
each driver had a duty to keep a lookout and that it was
negligence to fail to see what was plain to be seen. This
statement by appellant is not entirely correct. The court,
in instruction 13 (R.. 91), instructed the jury as follows.
"It was the duty of Harry S. Muhlbach to
use reasonable care under the circumstances in
driving ills truck to avoid danger to himself and
others and to observe and to be aware of the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, arul
other existing cond·itions; in that regard, he was
obliged to observe detail in respect to :
"(A) Keep a proper lookout for o·ther vehcles or other condit~ons reasonably to be antoicipated. * * *" (italics ours)
In a following instruction given by the court, instruction 15 (R. 93), the jury was instructed as follows:
"Bef?re. contributory negligence would preclude plaintiff's recovery, you must find from a
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preponderance of the evidem·p that each of the
following propositions are true:
··Proposition No. One:
"That the plaintiff was negligent in the operation of his truck just before the alleged incident
in one or Inon· of the following particulars:
"(a) •••
,. (b)

•••

"(c) 'l,hat plaintiff was maintaining a lookout; or •••."
Throughout the instructions, the jury was adequatPlr instructed tha1t negligence consisted of doing or failing
to do what a reason~ble, prudent p<'rson would not have
or would have done under the cireuutstances. It is obvious that under the instructions as given, the jury would
have had litth· trouble in ascertaining that failure to s-ee
what was readily available to be seen constituted negligence.
Defendant's requested instruction 16 was properly
refused in that it does not state the law. H fails to take
into account the right of an individual using an arterial
highway to assmne reasonalble and lawful conduct on the
pa1,t of others until such time as something would occur
to place him on notice to the contrary.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VERY PROPERLY REFUSED TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT; AND THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERICT.
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Defendant seen1s to cmnpletely overlook the fact that
plaintiff had the right to rely on safe and rea~onable conduct on the part of others using the highway until such
ti1ne as, in the exercise orf due care, he noticed or should
have noticed smnething to the contrary.

Mr. H ert:ig was obliged to stop ot the stop .sign and
yield the ·right of way to plaintiff. -17-6-74.10 (b), Utah
Code Annot:ated 1953, provides :
''Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.
Ex,cept when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal, every driver of a
vehicle approaching a stop interseCJtion indicated
by a ,stop sign shall 8top as required by Section
41-6-99, and after having stopped', shall yield the
right of way to any vehicle which has entered
the interse'ction frmn another highway or which
is approaching so closely on another highway as
to constitute an immediate hazard during the
time when such driv-er is moving acro'Ss or within the intersection."
Mr. Hertig w.as obliged to stop and yield the right
of way to plaintiff, and should not have entered the intersection while the plaintiff's vehicle or any other vehicles
were approaching so closely as to cons,titute an immediate hazard during the time _Mr. Hertig's vehicle was
moving acros~s or within the intersection.

Mr. Muhlbach had the right to rely on the assumption that Mr. Hartig would stop or remain stoppe-d at
the stop sign unt,il he observed, or in the exercise of due
care shou-ld have observed, something to warn him to the
contrary.
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<·a~t·~ of illarfin r. Stevens, lD:J~, 1~1 U.
747 and Peter. . ·ou r. N1'else11, 1959, 9 lT.~d
:;-t:; P.~d 731, the Supre1ne Oourt of the StatP of

In both the
-!S-1-,
:HI~.

~+3 P.~d

lm~

('learly pronounced the law with respect to
the degree an individual is ·entitled to rely on ~afe and
rpm.;onabh• conduet of others, especially a-t intersections
whPre one driver i~ favored with the right of way.
lltah

In the case of Peterso11 r. Nielson, plaintiff's vehide
\ra~ traveling· down a highway at about sixt)· miles per
hour. Defendant approached the highway from a side
road which apparently intersected the highway at a 90degree ang·le. As he approached, he stopped a1t a stop
sign, and then without looking and observing plaintiff's
car, proceeded out onto the highway. A collision re~ulted.

In the Pete·rson v. ~: ielson case, the trial court disInissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that plaintiff was
traveling at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent,
that she failed to sound her horn, and that she failed to
observe the defendant had his attention focused on another automobile. The Supre1ne Court of the State of
Utah reversed the trial court and very succincJtly stated
the law in the State of Utah, as follows:
''Having observed the defendant stop as he
was about to enter the highway, at any time after
plaintiff was close enough to constitute an immediate hazard to him, she could assume that he
would remain stopped and accord her the right
of way. She could continue to rely on that assumption until she observed, or should have obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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served, something to warn her to the contr~ry.
It may be true that a high degree of caution
would have impelled her to apprehend t~at the
defendant might suddenly dart onto the highway
in front of her. But she was not obliged to do so.
While extraordinary caution is commendable, it
is not required as a ·standard otf conduct. The
concept of contributory negligence must not be
so extended as to require one to drive under the
apprehension that the other driver will be guilty
of a sudden burst of negligence. If .all drivers
were required to be that cautious and await upon
each other, it would 'Seriously impede the movement of traffic and make driving upon modern
high speed arterial highways quite impractical.
"The prdblen1 then is: at the instant defendant S'ta~ted up from his stopped position, was
the plaintiff far enough to the north that she
could have avoided the collision¥''
In the case now pending before the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah on appeal, it is to be remembered
that the plaintiff, Mr. lVluhlbach, anticipated ~:lr. Hertig
would remain stopped at the stop sign until ~:lr. ~fuhlbach
had proceeded pa!S't the intersection (R. 149-166). When
)Jr. Muhlbac!h blas1ted his ~air horn, the defendant suddenly and unexpectedly shot out in front of plaintiff,
forcing him off the highway (R. 149).
Appellant seems to argue that plaintiff was contributorily negligent for having failed to see defendant in
ti1ne to avoid the situatioin which forced him off tlhe
roadway; however, ~the real question is whether or not
a reasonable, prudent person would have been able to
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:letenuine dPfendant wa:-: not going to ~top or rematn
stopped at tlw stop sign in enough tinte so that sai<i
t·easonable, prudent person could have ta:ken evasive
action and avoided a collision and being forced off the
highwa~·. Defendant's proof wai-i lacking in this regard,
n.nd plaintiff contends that in light of defendant's sudden burst of speed, a reasona:bl~. prudent person would
not have been able to avoid being forced off the highway,
as was the plaintiff, ~I r. lVIuhlbac!h.
Appellant attentpts to prove contributory negligence
on the part of the pl,aintiff through the use of a stateInent given h~· plaintiff to the investigating officer following the roll-over. During the invP~tigation following the
roll-over, Offi~er Keith I'ba asked Mr. ~Luhlbach ''how
man~· feet it was he first noticed danger of the aerident"
(R. 180). "He (.M~lhlbach) told 1ne it was thirty feet
away" (R. 180).
It should be noted that .Mr. 1\luhlbach did not say the
e.ar of .Mr. Hertig was thirty feet away "\vhen he first
noticed it, but his state1uent indicates it was thirty feet
.away when danger of the accident becmne apparent.
This statement should be reviewed in light of existing
circutnstances.
During the trial, defendant introduced a statement
taken frmn l\[r. Jed I~. ~~c~lillan, an independent witnet't'. This exhibit wa~ designated, "Exhibit 11D". In
the exhibit, l\lr. ~Ic~Iillan strutes 'vhat he observed when
he arrived at the scene of the incident, as follow:;; :
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"The driver was pulling himself up out of the
truck. He was in a state of shock. He did not say
anything, as he was in a daz·e. I sat him to the side
of the road."
It i~ raNwr apparent that _j1r. nluhlbach was severally
shaken up as a result of the roll-over.
\Vhen yon consider that the veer n1arks left by plaintiff's ~truck commenced some thirteen feet southeast of
the intersection ( R. 128) and when you consider that at
thirty-five mile·s per hour, tJhe plaintiff would travel over
thivty-eight feet during a three-quarters of a second
reaction timt>, it is obvious from the physical evidence
that plaintiff did observe the dange1r when he was more
than ·1fuirty feet away fr01n the defendant's automo1bile.
It is folly to assume that an individual suddenly
confronted with an apparent collision, or the danger
thereof, would very carefully calculate how 1nany feet
away from various objects he "ras a:t that point.
At best, all that can be said of the staten1enrt concerning the thirty feet so often referred to is that it was a
guess given by an individual who had been severally
shaken up as a result of being jostled about in a large
truek ~which rolled over and which was not apparently
correct in view of physical evidence found at the scene
of the collision.
T'he Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah very wisely pointed out in the case of Gittens v. Lundberg (1955)
~ U.2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115:
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"It is not a prerequisite to credibility that a
witness be entirely accurate with respect to every
detail of his testinwny. If it were so, hu1nan frailties are ~ twh that it would be seldon1 that a witness who testified to any extent could be believed.
The jury 1nay evaluate thP testimony of witnesses
and accept those parts wthich they deem credible,
even though there be some inconsistencies."
Sergeant Pitcher's te:stimon~· was helpful in s01ne
areas in that he wm; able to explain to the jury what a
reaction ti1ne is and was able to explain several other
bas ie factors. Howev-er, beyond fuat, his testin1ony was
of little help. Certainly the testimony of Sergeant Pitcher did not es'tablish any facts which could be relied upon
on the real and ilnportant questions involved in this law~nit.

While defendant Hertig ad1nitted that he accelerated
to the speed of fifty Iniles per hour (R. 187), at which
speed he proceeded down the Oottonwood Diagonal, the
calculations upon which appellant relies are based upon
an average speed fron1 the intersection to a red mark
drawn on an exhibit of ten 1niles per hour. As there
never was an accurate calibration of defendant's speed
to that point, and in view of tihe fact that the ·witness,
Jed K. ~Icl\Iillan, noticed defendant's vehicle "fishtail"
under heavy acceleration (R. 270-271), the figure of ten
miles per hour is, in fact, unrealistic.
A red mark was drown on Exhibit 9D by defendant
Hertig as his approximation of where he was when he
c01nmenced making a left turn. There was no ph~~sical
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evidence at the scene of the collision which would indicate
exactly where thi'S point was. The n1ere f.a.ct that this red
1nark was placed on a scale drawing does not take it out
of the realn1 of speculation. As it app:e.ared to both
Harry ~Iuhlbach and the independent witness, :.Mr. Jed
K. McMillan, that the defendant, :Mr. Hertig, was going
to proceed nortl~ on 13th East (R. 149, R. 270, R. 271)
but made a very hurried left turn upon hearing the
blast of the .air horn, the g:r:eat weight of the evidence
would tend to indicate that :Mr. Hertig did not place
the red mark on the drawing where it should have been
placed.
Based upon an unknown, that being the average
speed of defendant Hertig from the stop sign into the
distance to the red 1nark, Sergeant Pitcher atten1pted to
intersection, and another llll!known, the hypothetical
establish how far away from the intersection the plaintiff was when Mr. H·ertig left the stop sign. In addition,
Sergeant Pitcher, by his own adnrission, did not take
into consideration the factors of judgment time and
break lag time, which he admits should have been taken
into consideration (R. 255, 261, 262).
Such flimsy evidence was c:learly not a basis for
setting aside the ve:nlict of the jury, nor could it reasonably fonn a basis for a directed verdict or new trial.
AppeHant see1ns to completely overlook an individual's right to rely upon the reasonable conduc.t of others
until something happens which should place hi1n on notice
to the contrary. If the law placed a burden upon drivers
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u~ing

artPrial highway~ to anticipate negligent, rPekh_·~~,
OI' other unl,awful conduct on the part of others, there is
no qtw~.tion but what the flow of traffic would be seriously impeded. If a driver using an arterial highway
were under a duty to slan1 on his brakes or slow down
suddenly when he saw a driver approa~hing the highway
frmn a side road controlled by a stop sign, the danger
of rear end collision would greatly outweigh an~· advantage to be gained therefrmn.
Questions of whether or not plaintiff was negligent
in any respect, whether his negligence, if any, constituted
a factor which proximately contributed to the roll-over,
the question of the extent to which he could rely on
reasonalble conduct on the part of othm:s until something warned him to the contrary, are all jury questions.
The case of Mart,in v. Stepens (1952) 121 U. -1:84, 243
P.2d 7-l-7, clearly states these n1atters to be questions for
the jury.
It is elmnentary that unless it could be said that
reasonable minds could not differ on a proposition, it
should be le'ft to jury. If in this case there are any questions upon which reasonaJble minds could not differ, they
should have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant. If we are to say that anyone "Tas
negligent as a n1atter of law, it can only be said that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law for failing
to have observed plaintiff's truck as it proceeded towards and entered the intersection. It could only be said
that defendant was negligent as a matter of law for
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failing to stop or reinain stopped at the stop sign and
for having failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff.
In any event, the jury decided the issues in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant under proper
instruction from the Court.

CONCLUSION
IN CONCLUSION, THE JUDGMENT IN THE
LOWER COURT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED, AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT SHOULD BE A. WARDED COSTS.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK, JOHNSON,
SCHOENHALS & ROBERTS
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
and

COT·RO-MANES AND
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